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HUD’S OBLIGATION TO “AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHER” FAIR 
HOUSING: A CLOSER LOOK AT HOPE VI 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 (“FHA”) mandates that the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) must “affirmatively further” fair 
housing.1  While the FHA prohibits HUD from discriminating in the 
administration of the nation’s housing, it also requires that HUD take positive 
action to provide for sound development of the nation’s distressed 
communities.2  In 1993, HUD created the Urban Revitalization Demonstration 
project, which became known more commonly as Homeownership and 
Opportunity for People Everywhere (“HOPE VI”).3  This program makes 
federal grants available for local housing authorities to revitalize their 
“severely distressed” public housing.4  In the past decade, HOPE VI projects 
almost invariably have involved the eradication of older, larger housing 
developments in favor of significantly smaller, mixed-income communities. 
Reaction to HOPE VI has been mixed.  While advocates point to the 
program’s ability to replace dilapidated housing super-structures with more 
attractive communities,5 critics have argued that HOPE VI has contributed to 
the decline in the supply of affordable housing.6  Overwhelmingly, the class of 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2000). 
 2. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 
1987). 
 3. Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent 
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571 (1993). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Patrick E. Clancy & Leo Quigley, HOPE VI: A Vital Tool for Comprehensive 
Neighborhood Revitalization, 8 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 527 (2001) (arguing that HOPE 
VI provides substantial resources that may actually increase the number of moderate and low 
income families receiving assistance and can “help those families most at risk of failure under 
welfare reform advance toward self-sufficiency in supportive, mixed-income, well-managed 
settings”). 
 6. See National Housing Law Project, False Hope: A Critical Assessment of the HOPE VI 
Public Housing Redevelopment Program, (2002), available at 
http://www.nhlp.org/html/pubhsg/FalseHOPE.pdf  (noting that HOPE VI and other HUD 
programs have been responsible for a net loss of over 107,000 public housing units through 
demolition in recent years); see also Christopher Swope, Rehab Refugees, GOVERNING MAG., 
May 2001, at 40-41, available at http://governing.com/archive/2001/may/housing.txt (last visited 
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people most displaced by the destruction of existing housing projects is poor 
African-Americans.  As such, some have argued that HOPE VI projects may 
violate the Fair Housing Act if the displacement of public housing residents 
has a disparate impact on an FHA-protected class.7  Challenges to HOPE VI 
have been largely unsuccessful, primarily because HUD enjoys broad 
discretion in its funding decisions and the standard of review for judicial 
intervention is high.  Trial courts generally review a HOPE VI program only 
for abuse of discretion or egregious error.8  As such, HUD can almost always 
demonstrate that its projects satisfy the legal requirements of the FHA and that 
it has met its obligation to “affirmatively further” fair housing. 
This Comment explores what it means to “affirmatively further” fair 
housing.  Specifically, it examines the role of the judiciary in narrowing the 
range of HUD’s discretion in the HOPE VI context and ensuring that HUD 
fulfills its obligation to affirmatively further fair housing.  The analysis will 
center on the case of Darst-Webbe Tenant Association Board v. Saint Louis 
Housing Authority,9 in which a public housing tenant’s association challenged 
the implementation of a HOPE VI grant.  The Comment ultimately concludes 
that it is unlikely the judiciary will be effective in producing significant change 
in the way HUD administers HOPE VI, given the deference afforded to 
government agencies and the lack of substantive requirements for HOPE VI 
proposals.  It first provides a brief history of U.S. housing policy in Part II and 
 
Jan. 15, 2005) (noting that in the 1990s, of the approximately 100,000 public housing units 
destroyed under HOPE VI, only 60,000 were scheduled to be replaced). 
  While the causes of the decline in the public housing supply are subject to debate, no one 
can dispute that a shortage does in fact exist for those families with the lowest incomes.  The 
number of public housing units affordable to those with “very low incomes,” at or below 50% of 
area median income, fell by 1.3 million between 1991 and 1999—an 8% loss overall. See What 
do we know about shortages of affordable rental housing?: Testimony before the House 
Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity (2001) 
(testimony of Kathryn P. Nelson, Office of Policy Development and Research), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/050301ne.pdf.  For “extremely low income renters” 
(at or below 30% AMI), units decreased by 940,000- a 14% loss. Id. According to data published 
in a separate 2001 HUD report, for every 100 very low income families, there were only 70 units 
affordable and actually available to them. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT, A REPORT ON WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS IN 1999: NEW OPPORTUNITY 
AMID CONTINUING CHALLENGES, 8-9 (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.huduser.org/ 
publications/affhsg/wc99.pdf  (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).  Only 40 units were affordable and 
available for every 100 extremely low income households. Id.   
 7. This paper will explore in greater detail a case in which a public housing tenant board 
filed a disparate impact claim against the St. Louis Housing Authority for using a HOPE VI grant 
to demolish their complex. See infra Part V. 
 8. See N.A.A.C.P., 817 F.2d at 157. 
 9. Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth. (Darst Webbe I), 202 F. Supp. 
2d 938 (E.D. Mo. 2001), aff’d in part and remanded in part by 339 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2003), 
remanded to 299 F. Supp. 2d 952 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d 417 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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discusses the impact of the FHA in Part III.  Following a more detailed 
examination of the HOPE VI program in Part IV, the Comment shifts it focus 
to the Darst-Webbe case in Part V. 
This analysis focuses primarily on the role of the judiciary in HOPE VI 
and stops short of asserting that HUD is failing to satisfy its fair housing 
obligation.  Nonetheless, it concludes by noting that HUD should do more to 
ensure that HOPE VI actually provides for those residents most in need of its 
advocacy and protection.  At a minimum, HUD should undertake a critical and 
comprehensive review of HOPE VI to analyze its role in reducing the supply 
of available affordable housing. 
II.  HISTORY OF U.S. HOUSING POLICY 
A. The Origins of Public Housing 
The federal government first became significantly involved in public 
housing with the passage of the 1937 Wagner-Steagall Act (“United States 
Housing Act of 1937”).10  This Depression-era legislation was designed to 
create jobs and to serve as a slum clearance plan.11  The bill would provide 
financial assistance for housing “to alleviate present and recurring 
unemployment and to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions 
and the acute shortage of decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for families of 
low income.”12  The housing component of the program was directly tied to 
the creation of jobs and sought to prepare workers for industrial and service 
employment.13  Local public housing authorities (“PHAs”) were organized and 
worked to plan and construct housing developments using federal grant money.  
These local PHAs also assumed responsibility for administering the 
developments.  The original bill provided that operating expenses would be 
paid for with the rents collected from tenants.14  This initial phase of public 
 
 10. Wagner-Steagall Housing Act, Ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1437 (2000)).  The federal government was involved in public housing projects prior to 
the Housing Act of 1937, albeit on a much smaller scale. See Michael S. FitzPatrick, Note, A 
Disaster in Every Generation: An Analysis of HOPE VI: HUD’S Newest Big Budget Development 
Plan, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 421, 424-25 (2000) (discussing early federal housing 
support, including a federal initiative to build housing for factory workers involved in the war 
effort during World War I). 
 11. Wagner-Steagall Housing Act, Ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (stating that the goals of the 
legislation were job creation, slum clearance, and to provide housing). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Harry J. Wexler, HOPE VI: Market Means/Public End—The Goals, Strategies, and 
Midterm Lessons of HUD’s Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program, 10 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 195, 199 (2001) (noting that “[t]he 1937 Housing Act . . . acknowledged 
federal responsibility for providing housing for the poor, but linked this social purpose to a larger 
political and economic mandate . . . to create jobs . . . and stimulate the economy”). 
 14. See FitzPatrick, supra note 10, at 428. 
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housing lasted through the 1950s and was, in many ways, part of a larger 
system of public welfare.15 
B. The 1960s: Super-Structure Model of Public Housing 
The 1960s brought a boom in public housing development, centered on the 
construction of high-density, high rise facilities.16  The high rise model was 
popular because it enabled PHAs to keep land and construction costs down in 
the face of limited budgets and ever increasing need.17  This high-density 
model, however, was poorly conceived and under funded.18  Drugs, violence, 
and poor upkeep quickly led to rapid deterioration.19  Apart from maintenance 
and safety issues, the failures of the high-rise developments were exacerbated 
by the fact that the sites led to isolation and detachment from the existing 
community,20 as well as the fact that the structures were built almost 
 
 15. See Wexler, supra note 13, at 199 (noting that public housing “include[ed] settlement 
houses and other social agencies, intended to prepare entry-level workers for the lower rungs of 
industrial and service employment”). 
 16. See R. ALLEN HAYS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING 97 (1995) 
(noting that in the 1960s, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations authorized the construction of 
more than 700,000 units of public housing). 
 17. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF 
FRUSTRATION 120 (1968). 
 18. Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go From Here?, 60 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 501, 501-06 (1993) (discussing the financial constraints on HUD and housing 
authorities and their effect on construction and maintenance decisions). 
 19. Wexler¸ supra note 13, at 198 (noting that various factors such as urban poverty, drug-
related crime, poor and discriminatory location decisions by local PHAs, excessively high 
density, and poor property management all combined to increase distress of the public housing 
stock); see also EUGENE J. MEEHAN, THE QUALITY OF FEDERAL POLICYMAKING: PROGRAMMED 
FAILURE IN PUBLIC HOUSING, 27-30, 59-60 (1979) (noting that a combination of scarcity of 
funds and failed management led to poor upkeep); ’FitzPatrick, supra note 10, at 428-29 (noting 
that as “[d]enser populations paying less and less in rent moved i[n],” operating expenses could 
not be met). 
 20. Perhaps the most poignant example of high rise isolation was the Robert Taylor Homes 
on Chicago’s south side.  When it was completed in 1962, Robert Taylor was the largest public 
housing complex in the world, housing more than 18,000 people in 4,300 units.  Chicago Housing 
Authority, Robert Taylor Homes, http://thecha.org/housingdev/Robert_taylor.html; Devereux 
Bowley, Architects and Residents of Public Housing, PERSPECTVES ON THE PROFESSION, Dec. 
1983, available at http://ethics.iit.edu/perspective/pers3_4dec83_2.html.  The apartments were 
arrayed in a lineal series of 28 16-story high rises that stretched for more than two miles.  Id.  The 
towers protruded from the middle of an industrial wasteland near Lake Michigan, while the 
decent, white working class bungalows lie to the west- separated by the massive ten-lane Dan 
Ryan Expressway.  Id. 
  Most of the high rises have now been demolished and the Chicago Housing Authority is 
transforming the property into a mixed-income development with the assistance of several HOPE 
VI Revitalization grants. Robert Taylor Homes HOPE VI Site Profile,  
http://www.housingresearch.org/hrf/hrf_SiteProfile.nsf/0/6af186cae30586e5852569d5004d1744?
OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 12, 2006); see also Michael Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The 
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exclusively in urban city-centers while jobs and growth migrated to the 
suburbs.21 
With the booming economy and housing market in the decades following 
World War II, “public housing “quickly became the housing of last resort, 
segregated to the lowest-income populations and ghettos for racial 
minorities.”22  The physical isolation of the overwhelmingly minority-
inhabited housing projects was not unintentional, as public housing authorities 
often bowed to intense local opposition and political pressure not to build 
developments in working and middle class neighborhoods.23  HUD attempted 
to remedy the effects of discrimination in the selection process by imposing 
site selection standards in the 1970s.24  The standards prevented the 
construction of new developments “in neighborhoods with high concentrations 
of low income minority residents,” but as HUD was effectively powerless to 
override local opposition and the decisions of local PHAs, the effect was to 
even further limit the number of possible sites for projects.25 
C. The 1970s: Section 8 
Intending to remedy the failure of past programs and move away from the 
disastrous high rise model for public housing,26 the federal government 
introduced Section 8 in 1973.27 Section 8 was a subsidy program designed to 
create a “free market system for affordable housing” by providing incentives 
for developers to enter the public housing market.28  The goal was to move 
housing construction and management responsibilities to the private sector 
through the use of subsidies.  Two types of subsidies were created: project-
based and tenant-based.29  Project-based subsidies allowed developers to create 
 
Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1285, 1300-08 (1995) (discussing a study on the impact of high levels of public housing on 
the neighborhood). 
 21. See Schill & Wachter, supra note 20, at 1295. 
 22. FitzPatrick, supra note 10, at 430. 
 23. See Wexler, supra note 13, at 200. As Wexler notes, “HUD had the power to prevent 
further segregation (in public housing), but it lacked the authority or tools to override local 
opposition to the placement of public housing in working and middle class neighborhoods or in 
suburban areas.” Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. FitzPatrick, supra note 10, at 432 (citing R. ALLEN HAYS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
AND URBAN HOUSING 139-42 (1995)). 
 27. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383 § 201(a), 88 
Stat. 633, 662 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) (2000)).   
 28. See FitzPatrick, supra note 10, at 431-32. 
 29. Id. at 432 (citing R. ALLEN HAYS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING 
148-49, 153 (1995)).   
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new or rehabilitate existing private housing reserved for low income families.30  
The tenant-based subsidy provided eligible tenants with a voucher to pay for 
private market housing.31  While these private market programs were designed 
around the proposition that private intervention would reduce the inefficiency 
and mismanagement inherent in earlier public housing programs, they 
generally did not succeed in producing a large scale increase in home 
ownership among the very poor.32 
D. The 1980s: Budget Cuts, Scandal, and Continued Decay 
The 1980s brought even worse developments for affordable housing 
programs as President Reagan sharply cut spending on domestic and social 
welfare initiatives.  Public housing spending decreased drastically, stretching 
already thin budgets at HUD and at local PHAs.  Of the funding available, 
most was for Section 8 tenant vouchers, as opposed to the construction of new 
public housing.33  HUD’s already weakened image was further tarnished when 
scandal rocked the agency at the end of the Reagan administration.34  HUD’s 
Secretary had used money appropriated for Section 8 new construction as a 
personal slush fund.35  By the end of the decade, public housing faced 
insurmountable challenges: a deteriorated stock of developments, incompetent 
management, budget shortfalls, animosity between PHAs and the residents 
they were supposed to serve, and public distrust of the agency charged with 
providing for the housing needs of the urban poor.36 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. HAYS, supra note 16, at 113-21 (discussing the failures of the program). 
 33. Id. at 238-41. 
 34. Id. at 252. 
 35. Id. at 252-55. 
 36. Wexler, supra note 13, at 200-01. 
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E. The 1990s: HUD Reforms and HOPE VI37 Emerges 
It was in this climate38 that Congress formed a commission in 1989 to 
study the housing crisis and propose reforms in the government’s role in and 
administration of public housing.39  The National Commission on Severely 
Distressed Public Housing - comprised of eighteen members appointed by the 
House, Senate, and HUD - was charged with developing a plan for handling 
the nation’s deteriorated housing stock.40  The Commission met for a year and 
issued its final report in August of 1992.41  The report recommended the 
eradication of the nation’s “severely distressed public housing” as a means of 
freeing up resources for HUD and local PHAs to more effectively manage new 
and existing projects.42  Specifically, the Commission suggested that six 
percent of the nation’s 1.4 million “severely distressed” housing units should 
be destroyed by the year 2000.43  The Commission’s recommendations led 
Congress to appropriate $300 million in the fall of 1992 to create the Urban 
Revitalization Demonstration project, which became known more commonly 
as HOPE VI.44  The program was designed to help local PHAs eliminate their 
large, expensive, deteriorated developments through the use of federal grants.45  
With the elimination of these failed budget-busting units, local housing 
authorities would have more funds to administer existing units while 
simultaneously adding new, more successful developments as part of a system 
of urban renewal in America’s cities.46 
 
 37. HOPE is an acronym for Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere. See, 
e.g., Homeownershop and Opportunity Through HOPE Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4148 
(1990); see also Wexler, supra note 13, at 228 n.9.  It was initially enacted as part of the 
Cranston-Gonzales National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, which consisted of three 
homeownership programs: HOPE I (Indian Housing tenants), HOPE II (sale of units in 
multifamily projects owned by HUD or other government agencies), and HOPE III (sale of 
single-family units in scattered site projects). Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4148, 4162, 4172 
(1990); see also Wexler, supra note 13, at 228 n.9.  The Act also contained HOPE IV (elderly 
housing vouchers) and HOPE V (job training for disadvantaged youth), which were enacted in 
1992 as part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992. 104 Stat. at 4317; see 
also Wexler, supra note 13, at 228 n.9. 
 38. As Wexler notes, “[a]wareness of the problems of severely distressed public housing had 
been bubbling up for a decade.” Wexler, supra note 13, at 198.  In 1979, a HUD commissioned 
study (Jones et al. 1979) had concluded that seven percent of public housing units were troubled 
on four primary counts: social, physical, financial, and managerial. Id.  Ten years later, a second 
HUD study (Abt Associates 1988) reported that five to eight percent of the nation’s public 
housing stock needed substantial renovation and redesign - at an estimated cost of $22 billion. Id. 
 39. Department of Housing and Urban Development Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
235, tit. V, 103 Stat. 1987, 2048-49 (1989). 
 40. Department of Housing and Urban Development Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
235, §§ 501, 503, 103 Stat. 1987, 2048-49 (1989).  Specifically, Congress asked the Commission 
to identify projects in distress, assess the most promising strategies for eliminating unfit living 
conditions, and to develop a national action plan for the eradication of unfit living conditions in 
public housing by the year 2000. Department of Housing and Urban Development Reform Act of 
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In 1998, Congress passed the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility 
Act of 1998 (“Public Housing Reform Act of 1998”).47  The bill authorized 
multi-year funding for HOPE VI.48 It also provided additional guidelines for 
 
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-235, § 504, 103 Stat. 1987, 2048-49 (1989); see also Wexler, supra note 
13, at 197-98. 
 41. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUBLIC HOUSING, THE FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUBLIC HOUSING: A 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 38, 
xiii (1992) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
 42. Id. at 36-37. 
 43. Id. at 2. 
 44. Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent 
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571, 1579 (1993). 
 45. In determining which developments were “severely distressed” and thus eligible for 
elimination under the program, Congress used the criteria recommended by the Commission. 
Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571, 1580 (1993).  Their definition 
and rating system focused on four conditions: “[i.] families living in distress; [ii.] rates of serious 
crime in the development or surrounding neighborhood; [iii.] barriers to managing such 
developments (e.g. high vacancy and turnover rates, low rent collection, and high rate of rejection 
of unit by prospective tenants); and, [iv.] physical deterioration of buildings. See FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 41, App. B, B2.  These criteria were further refined and codified in section 535 of the 
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461, 
2518, 2584-2585 (1998) (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 46. As Henry Cisneros, former HUD Secretary under President Bill Clinton from 1993 to 
1997, noted, HOPE VI aims to revitalize the worst of public housing by replacing it with 
“smaller-scale, economically integrated housing that is an anchor for neighborhood renewal.” 
’’Wexler, supra note 13, at 196. 
 47. Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 
2461, 2518, 2584-2585 (1998) (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 48. Prior to the Public Housing Reform Act, HOPE VI was administered by annual 
appropriations. Section 535 of the Public Housing Reform Act extended funding for the program 
through September 30, 2002. Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-276, § 535, 112 Stat. 2461, 2585 (1998) (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
Congress appropriated more than $574 million for fiscal year 2003 and signed legislation 
reauthorizing the program through fiscal year 2006. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437v(m)(l) (2005); HOPE VI 
Program Reauthorization and Small Community Mainstreet Rejuvenation and Housing Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-186, §§ 401-402, 117 Stat. 2693, 2693-2694 (2003).  However, President 
George Bush has expressed little interest in funding the program.  Both his FY2004 and FY2005 
budgets proposed no new appropriations for HOPE VI. COUNCIL OF LARGE PUBLIC HOUSING 
AUTHORITIES, FY 2004 OMNIBUS, CONTAINING HUD FUNDING, RELEASED, 
http://www.clpha.org/page.cfm?pageID=49; COUNCIL OF LARGE PUBLIC HOUSING 
AUTHORITIES, CLPHA CONCERNED BY HUD FY05 BUDGET, http://www.slpha.org/ 
page.cfm?pageID=440.  On January 22, 2004, Congress passed a FY2004 consolidated 
appropriations bill that included $150 million for HOPE VI. COUNCIL OF LARGE PUBLIC 
HOUSING AUTHORITIES, FY 2004 OMNIBUS, CONTAINING HUD FUNDING, RELEASED, 
http://www.clpha.org/page.cfm?pageID=49.  While this is certainly better than zero funding, it is 
a sharp drop from previous HOPE VI appropriations that hovered in the $550 million annually 
range.  Id.; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOPE VI 
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authorizing funding and administering the program.49  HOPE VI currently 
operates according to a patchwork of regulations.50  Among these is the actual 
appropriations bill from Congress, which is often short and unremarkable in 
description or assistance.51  Additionally, guidelines are derived from the 
annual Notice of Funding Availability (“NOFA”) that HUD issues each year 
after receiving the appropriations from Congress.52  The NOFA essentially 
outlines the amount of grant money earmarked for HOPE VI that year, spells 
out the program requirements and guidelines for applicants, and requests 
housing authorities to submit proposals for grant consideration.53  Each NOFA 
also outlines the ranking structure used to score the applications during the 
highly competitive review process.54  HUD has tailored the program with each 
subsequent NOFA, including altering the selection criteria, adjusting the 
scoring, and capping the amount of possible awards.55 
The original goals of HOPE VI centered largely on 1) eliminating the most 
blighted housing projects and pockets of despair and 2) creating environments 
that would encourage self-sufficiency and support family movement out of 
public housing.56  “From its initial focus on [transforming] the very worst 
public housing developments in the largest U.S. cities,” HUD significantly 
broadened HOPE VI’s scope and purposes throughout the late 1990s.57  
 
FISCAL YEAR 2003 FUNDING INFORMATION, available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/ 
programs/ph/hope6/grants/fy03/index.cfm  (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). 
 49. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, About HOPE VI, History and 
Background, http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/ (last visited Jan. 31, 
2006). 
 50. The Public Housing Reform Act of 1998, annual NOFAs, and the individual contracts 
between HUD and the grantees all govern HOPE VI projects. FitzPatrick, supra note 10, at 437.  
As Congress has not passed authorizing legislation, HUD has not issued programmatic 
regulations governing HOPE VI; rather, each annual NOFA specifies the guidelines for that 
particular year. Id. 
 51. Id. (noting that in most cases, the relevant language in the appropriations bill is little 
more than a paragraph long). 
 52. See, e.g., Funding Availability for Urban Revitalization Demonstration: Notice, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 435, 436-50 (Jan. 5, 1993) (Notice of Funding Available for the program); Fiscal Year 1998 
Notice of Funding Availability for the Demolition of Severely Distressed Public Housing (HOPE 
VI Demolition) 63 Fed. Reg. 29,851, 28,852-29,857 (June 1, 1998). 
 53. See, e.g., Funding Availability for Urban Revitalization Demonstration: Notice, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 435, 436-47 (Jan. 5, 1993). 
 54. For a more thorough description of HUD’s scoring criteria and the review process, see 
infra Part IV. 
 55. FitzPatrick, supra note 10, at 437; see, e.g., Funding Availability for Urban 
Revitalization Demonstration: Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 435, 436-47 (Jan. 5, 1993); Fiscal Year 1998 
Notice of Funding Availability for the Demolition of Severely Distressed Public Housing (HOPE 
VI Demolition) 63 Fed. Reg. 29,851, 28,852-29,856 (June 1, 1998). 
 56. See Wexler, supra note 13, at 201. 
 57. These purposes included: lessening the concentration of very poor residents; creating 
mixed income communities for a diverse range of households; fostering partnerships to leverage 
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Among the more celebrated goals of the current HOPE VI program is to 
increase “home ownership possibilities for low- and moderate-income 
people.”58  According to HUD, HOPE VI envisions public housing as part of a 
community-based process towards self-sufficiency and thus focuses on 
creating a supportive and sustainable living environment for residents.59 
III.  HOPE VI AND THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
As the federal agency charged with overseeing the nation’s public housing, 
HUD must ensure it acts in accordance with federal law in administering the 
HOPE VI program.  The Fair Housing Act of 1968 is the most significant piece 
of federal legislation relating to housing discrimination and imposes 
restrictions and obligations that affect both private and public housing.60  By 
the terms of the FHA, HUD must “administer the programs and activities 
relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further 
the policies” of the FHA.61 
The FHA originated during the civil rights era and was intended to 
ameliorate the rampant discrimination that had plagued both the private 
housing market and the administration of public housing.62  As such, the FHA 
 
additional resources in the community; providing opportunities for family self-sufficiency; 
building sustainable housing designed to blend into and enrich the urban landscape; and, ensuring 
meaningful involvement of affected residents community members in the planning and 
implementation of the revitalization effort. See id.  
 58. FitzPatrick, supra note 10, at 436. 
 59. See id. 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000).  The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in all housing 
by making it illegal to “make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, 
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” Id. at § 3604.  Amendments in 1988 
significantly expanded the scope of the FHA’s protections to include persons with disabilities and 
families with children. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 800, 102 
Stat. 1619-1620, 1622 (1988). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2000). 
 62. What is commonly referred to as the Fair Housing Act is contained in Title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968. 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3619 (1988).  The Bill was passed within a week of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assignation in 1968. U.S Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Celebrating Fair Housing, http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/aboutfheo/history.cfm 
(last visited Sept 22, 2005).  “Since the 1966 open housing marches in Chicago, Dr. King’s name 
had been closely associated with fair housing legislation.” Id.  Congress regularly considered 
such legislation throughout 1966 and 1967, but never garnered a strong enough majority to pass a 
bill. Id.  President Johnson saw the legislation as a fitting tribute to Dr. King’s legacy and pushed 
the legislation through Congress with amazing speed amid civil unrest, signing the legislation into 
effect on April 11, 1968 - a mere week after King’s death and before his funeral in Atlanta. Id. 
See also Tracey McCartney and Sara Pratt, The Fair Housing Act: 35 Years of Evolution, (Mar. 
2003), available at http://www.fairhousing.com/include/media/pdf/35years.pdf. For a 
contemporaneous account of the political and social context of the passage of the Fair Housing 
Act, see Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 
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was designed to promote integration and prohibit discrimination in the nation’s 
housing.63  This includes both intentional, overt discrimination and actions that 
may have a discriminatory effect.64  Thus, at a minimum, “affirmatively 
furthering” fair housing requires HUD to administer its programs in a manner 
that seeks to reduce segregation and discrimination in the nation’s public 
housing supply.65  In the context of HOPE VI, this means that HUD must fund 
projects that aim to reduce segregation and do not have a discriminatory 
design.  Additionally, HUD is responsible for ensuring that a HOPE VI 
revitalization project does not have a discriminatory effect.66 
Beyond that, it is unclear what exactly HUD must do to “affirmatively 
further” public housing in the HOPE VI context.  HUD has not issued detailed 
regulations on HOPE VI that identify certain threshold requirements a project 
must meet to satisfy its FHA obligation.67  Quite the contrary, while HUD 
 
WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969), available at http://www.fairhousing.com/include/media/pdf/ 
dubofsky.pdf. 
 63. See Trafficante v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (citing 114 Cong. Rec. 
3422 (statement of Sen. Mondale)) (noting that Congress’ intent in passing the Federal Fair 
Housing Act was to replace the ghettos “by truly integrated and balanced living patterns” and “to 
remove the walls of discrimination which enclose minority groups”). 
 64. The Fair Housing Act “[has] been interpreted to prohibit facially neutral policies that 
have a disproportionate effect on individuals who are members of a protected class, regardless of 
the defendant’s subjective intent.” See Dana L. Miller, Comment, HOPE VI and TITLE VIII: How 
a Justifying Government Purpose Can Overcome The Disparate Impact Problem,  47 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 1277, 1291 (2003) (discussing the “disparate impact” theory of liability in a HOPE VI 
challenge) (citing Christopher P. McCormack, Note, Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing 
an Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 
563-64 (1986)).  This “disparate impact” theory of liability has been applied to the Fair Housing 
Act largely by analogy to case law interpreting Title VII (employment discrimination) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968. See Kristopher E. Ahrend, Effect, or No Effect: A Comparison of Prima 
Facie Standards Applied in “Disparate Impact” Cases Brought Under the Fair Housing Act 
(Title VIII), 2 RACE & ETHNICITY ANC. L. DIG. 64, 73 (1996); Christopher P. McCormack, Note, 
Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing an Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair 
Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 563-64 (1986); see also Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989) (explaining that a facially neutral employment practice may 
be unlawful because it has a disparate impact on a member of a protected class). 
 65. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(explaining that HUD’s duty under the Fair Housing Act requires the agency to “refrain from 
discriminating [itself] ([or] from purposely aiding discrimination by others)”).  To satisfy its duty, 
HUD must make its program decisions by utilizing an institutionalized process to gather relevant 
racial and socioeconomic data and then to weigh alternatives in light of that information and the 
FHA mandated policy against discrimination in federally assisted housing. See, e.g., Shannon v. 
United States Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 821-22 (3d Cir. 1970). 
 66. For a thorough examination of the disparate impact theory of liability in a HOPE VI 
case, see Miller, supra note 64, at 1291-1307. 
 67. For example, HUD could mandate a minimum public and private unit mix percentage, a 
minimum number of public units that must be made available in each new development based on 
the number of public units destroyed, or a minimum percentage of displaced families that must be 
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provides some basic guidelines, PHAs craft their plans from scratch - working 
with private developers, consultants and city planners to prepare a proposal.68  
These parties determine the details of the proposed project and HUD signs off 
on the award if the plan receives a sufficiently high score.  The process does 
not lend itself to an effective calculus of whether the project satisfies HUD’s 
duty to affirmatively further fair housing.  Moreover, the judicial process has 
afforded little guidance as to what it means to affirmatively further fair housing 
because there have been relatively few cases challenging HOPE VI awards.69  
Those trial courts that have heard HOPE VI challenges have not substantively 
analyzed the individual components of the revitalization plan.70  Thus, there is 
little, if any, precedent to guide HUD and local housing authorities - and those 
wishing to challenge the actions of housing authorities - in determining 
whether a project satisfies HUD’s FHA obligation. 
IV.  THE HOPE VI PROGRAM IN DETAIL: MAJOR ELEMENTS 
The application process for HOPE VI funding is highly competitive.71  As 
discussed earlier, each year HUD publishes a NOFA announcing the amount of 
grant money to be distributed and outlines the selection criteria and ranking 
 
permitted to return to the completed HOPE VI development. See infra pp. 21-23 (discussing 2004 
Notice of Funding Availability).  To date, HUD has avoided creating any such thresholds, 
preferring instead to allow individual applicants discretion to determine the appropriate quantity 
and mix of public housing units. See  id. 
 68. For a more detailed discussion of the guidelines, criteria, and scoring and review 
processes employed by HUD, see infra Part IV. 
 69. To be sure, some tenants and tenant associations have filed claims. See, e.g., 
GAUTREAUX V. CHICAGO HOUS. AUTH., 178 F.3d 951, 952, 954 (7th Cir 1999); Reese v. Miami-
Dade County, 210 F. Supp 2d 1324, 1327-28 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Cabrini-Green Local Advisory 
Council v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 04-C3792, 2005 WL 61467 at *1 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
 70. Although this discussion will be more fully developed infra Parts V & VI, a brief 
mention of several factors that are likely responsible for the lack of substantive analysis is 
appropriate here.  First, cases may be disposed of on procedural grounds before the court even 
gets to the merits. See infra p. 29 (discussing Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n v. St. Louis Hous. Auth. 
(Darst Webbe I), 229 F. Supp. 2d 952, 966-67 (E.D. Mo. 2004).  Also, HUD has not issued 
specific regulations or requirements for the specific components of a HOPE VI plan, as noted in, 
supra note 67.  Additionally, the standard of review for an administrative agency is high—usually 
“abuse of discretion” or “arbitrary or capricious”—and courts afford HUD considerable deference 
as a government agency charged with a specialized function. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1994). 
 71. Since its inception in 1993 through fiscal year 2003, HUD’s HOPE VI Revitalization 
Grant program has awarded 217 grants totaling more than $5.5 billion to PHAs in 118 cities. U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL FACT SHEET, FY 2003 
HOPE VI REVITALIZATION GRANT AWARDS, available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/ 
programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization/03/nationalfactsheet.pdf  (last visited Jan. 15, 2005) 
[hereinafter NATIONAL FACT SHEET].  HUD estimates that the grants have leveraged an 
additional $10.7 billion in public and private funds.  Id.  
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structure used to score each application.72  Local housing authorities submit 
proposals and HUD selects the winning plans based on the factors identified in 
the annual NOFA.  These factors have traditionally included: the level of 
obsolescence of the current project, resident consultation and involvement, 
density and income mix of the proposed project, leveraging of outside 
resources, resident self-sufficiency plans, and the need for funding.73  The 
most recent NOFA retains most of these factors in at least some form.74  Under 
the present scheme for evaluating and scoring HOPE VI applications, HUD 
also considers the capacity of the development team, the soundness of the 
project’s overall approach, and the proposal’s likelihood of creating a well 
functioning community.75 
A. Need for funding 
The HOPE VI program is centered on the goal of improving the living 
conditions of public housing residents by replacing the nation’s most “severely 
distressed” public housing projects with more sustainable communities.76  As 
such, the “need” component of a HOPE VI plan focuses primarily on the 
extent of the severe physical distress of the particular development marked for 
demolition.77  Loosely characterized, the more dilapidated the existing project, 
the greater the “need” for grant assistance.  To even qualify for HOPE VI 
funding, a project must first be declared “severely distressed”.”78  As spelled 
out in the 2004 NOFA, a severely distressed project is one that: 1) requires 
 
 72. See, e.g., Notice of Funding Availability for Revitalization of Severely Distressed Public 
Housing, HOPE VI Revitalization Grants Fiscal Year 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 64,136, (Nov. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter 2004 NOFA].“” 
 73. While not all of these factors are listed as individual criteria in the 2004 NOFA, this list 
is representative of the types of factors HUD has traditionally looked at when reviewing 
applications.  See e.g., Notice of Funding Availability for the Revitalization of Severely 
Distressed Public Housing; Fiscal Year 1997, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,242, 18,248-18,249, 18,251-
18.252, 18,254 (April 4, 1997); Notice of Funding Availability for the Revitalization of Severely 
Distressed Public Housing; Fiscal Year 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,766, 49,774-49,785 (July 31, 
2002).  Some of these categories are further sub-divided and not all criteria are included in this 
list. 
 74. See 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,155-64,164 pt. V(A).  The 2004 NOFA lists ten 
separate criteria (of varying importance) for assessing a HOPE VI application: Capacity, Need, 
Leveraging, Resident Involvement, Community Support Services, Relocation, Fair Housing and 
Equal Opportunity, Well-Functioning Community, Soundness of Approach, and Incentive 
Criteria on Regulatory Barrier Removal. These ten criteria are further subdivided to create a range 
of factors that are considered during the review process.  Id. 
 75. Id. at 64,155 pt. V(A)(1), 64,161-64,162 pt. V(A)(8)-(9). 
 76. Id. at 64,136 pt. I(A)(1). 
 77. Id. at 64,157 pt. V(A)(2)(a).  Relevant indicators of distress include deficiencies in 
infrastructure, poor heating, cooling, plumbing or electrical systems, poor drainage and sewers, 
major design deficiencies, and high levels of lead-based paint, PCBs, mold, or asbestos.  Id. 
 78. Id. at 64,136 pt. I(A)(1) (identifying severe distress as a threshold requirement). 
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major redesign, reconstruction, or demolition to correct serious design, 
maintenance, or other physical deficiencies; 2) is a significant contributing 
factor to the physical decline and disinvestment in the surrounding 
neighborhood; 3) is occupied by predominantly very low-income families with 
children or unemployed persons dependent on various forms of public 
assistance or has high rates of crime and vandalism relative to other housing in 
the neighborhood or is lacking in sufficient social and civil services resulting 
in severe distress; 4) cannot be revitalized through assistance from other 
programs due to cost and inadequacy of funding; and 5) the building is 
sufficiently separable from the rest of the project so as to make revitalization 
feasible.79  The need for revitalization also includes a consideration of the 
negative impact that the existing development has on the surrounding 
neighborhood.80  A grant recipient may utilize HOPE VI funds for a range of 
purposes to revitalize the “severely distressed” project, including relocation of 
residents, demolition, development, rehabilitation and improvement, and 
community supportive services.81 
In addition to the need for revitalization based on physical deterioration, 
the need requirement also considers the amount of capital funding available for 
the project from sources other than HOPE VI.82  HUD evaluates the extent to 
which the local PHA could utilize other resources and undertake the proposed 
redevelopment activities absent federal grant assistance.83  The applicant must 
also demonstrate a need for affordable accessible housing in the community.84  
HUD measures this need by looking at the Housing Choice Voucher program 
utilization rates and public housing occupancy rates for the local PHA’s 
housing inventory.85 
 
 79. 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,136-64,137 pt. I(C)(4)(a)(1)-(5).  The definition of 
“severely distressed” that HUD uses in administering HOPE VI is contained in the Public 
Housing Reform Act.  See Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-276, 112 Stat. 2461, 2518, 2584-2585 (1998) (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 80. 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,157 pt. V(A)(2)(b)(1).  In determining the impact on 
the surrounding neighborhood, HUD will evaluate crime statistics, socio-economic data, trends in 
property value, and indications of disinvestment, among others. Id. 
 81. Id. at 64,137 pt. I(D).  HUD lists additional uses, including disposition of the housing 
site, acquisition of land for the new site, homeownership activities, management and 
administration costs, and leveraging of additional resources. Id. at 64,137-64,138. 
 82. Id. at 64,158 pt. V(A)(2)(c)(1). 
 83. Id.  As HUD notes in the NOFA, “[l]arge amounts of available Capital Funds indicate 
that the revitalization could be carried out without a HOPE VI grant.  Available Capital Funds are 
defined as non-obligated funds that have not been earmarked for other purposes in your PHA 
Plan.” Id. 
 84. Id. at 64,158 pt. V(A)(2)(d). 
 85. 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,158 pt. V(A)(2)(d)(2). 
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B. Leveraging of Outside Resources 
Another criterion for evaluating HOPE VI proposals is the ability of the 
applicant to secure additional financing from outside resources to supplement 
the amount of federal grant money requested.86  Since 1997, leveraging of 
resources has played an increasingly important role in shaping HOPE VI 
proposals.87  The current structure effectively requires local PHAs to secure 
funding from outside resources.88  For a single HOPE VI development, these 
financing sources may include federal funds, bonds, conventional mortgage 
financing, tax-exempt financing, foundation grants or loans, pension funds, 
private equity, corporate contributions, and local government funding.89  The 
transactions can be quite complicated and often involve private developers 
forming limited partnerships to facilitate tax credits and tax-exempt bond 
financing.90  In many cases, these partnerships will be responsible for the 
development, ownership, and management of the new property.91  While many 
observers applaud leveraging as an innovative way to create successful long 
term communities, some have criticized the mixed finance model for 
permitting for-profit private developers to take advantage of public housing 
subsidies.92  Despite the dispute, several things are clear: leveraging is a 
powerful tool for local PHAs (not to mention a profitable mechanism for savvy 
developers) and a distinct feature of current HOPE VI projects.93  In many 
cases, the amount of leveraged funding totals three to four times the amount of 
the HOPE VI award.94 
 
 86. Id. at 64,158 pt. V(A)(3). 
 87. See generally Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) for the revitalization of Severely 
Distressed Public Housing (HOPE VI); Fiscal Year 1997, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,242, 18,253 (Apr. 14, 
1997). 
 88. Leveraging accounts for 16 points out of a possible 125. 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 
64,158 pt. V(A)(3), 64,164 pt. (V)(B)(2)(a)(4).  An applicant must demonstrate they have 
obtained firm commitments of funds and other resources from outside sources and points are 
awarded based on the ratio of the amount of funds requested to the amount of funds leveraged. Id. 
at 64,158 pt. (V)(A)(3). 
 89. McCormack, Baron and Salazar, Overview, Finance, http://www.mccormackbaron.com/ 
HTML/overview.html (last visited Jan. 7 2005). 
 90. See Wexler, supra note 13, at 214-15 for a more detailed description of how private 
developers are able to take advantage of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit.  As Wexler notes, 
the leading model for mixed finance developments is the one designed by St. Louis-based 
McCormack, Baron and Salazar. Id. at 215. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See Jerry Salama, The Redevelopment of Distressed Public Housing, 10 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 95, 119 (1999). 
 93. HUD reports that from the program’s inception through 2003, roughly $5.5 billion in 
HOPE VI grants have leveraged an additional $10.7 billion in public and private funds. See 
NATIONAL FACT SHEET, supra note 71.  In 2000 alone, the program averaged $3 of leverage for 
every $1 of grant awarded. See Press Release, HUD Awards $35 Million Grant to St. Louis, MO 
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C. Resident Self-Sufficiency Programs 
HOPE VI applications must also address the self-sufficiency issues and 
challenges of the public housing residents involved in the revitalization 
effort.95  The Community and Supportive Services (“CSS”) component of the 
program encompasses “all activities that are designed to promote upward 
mobility, self-sufficiency, and improved quality of life for the residents . . . 
involved.”96  These services include youth and adult educational activities, 
employment readiness and skills training, apprenticeship programs, 
entrepreneurship mentoring, life skills training, credit unions, homeownership 
counseling, health care and wellness centers, substance abuse counseling, 
domestic violence prevention, child care, and transportation.97  Initially, PHAs 
were allowed to spend up to twenty percent of their total budget on community 
and resident services.98  The latest version of HOPE VI mandates that no more 
than fifteen percent of a grant award may be allotted to CSS.99  HUD also 
requires that if more than five percent of a grant is allotted for CSS, the 
applicant must secure funding from non-HOPE VI sources that match the 
amount of CSS funding awarded.100 
 
to Transform Public Housing, Help Residents, (Oct. 15, 2001),http://www.hud.gov/news/ 
release.cfm?content=pr01-099.cfm (last visited Jan. 7, 2005) [hereinafter HUD Awards]. 
 94. St. Louis is home to several HOPE VI developments that were created with significant 
amounts of non-federal leveraged funds. HUD Awards, supra note 93.  In 1995, HUD awarded a 
$46.7 million HOPE VI grant to revitalize the Darst-Webbe development. Id.  That grant was 
leveraged with funds from the City of St. Louis, Missouri Housing Development Commission, 
Fannie Mae, St. Louis Equity Fund, Firstar Community Development Corporation, Bank of 
America, and others to create a $160 million development. Press Release, St. Louis Housing 
Authority, Near Southside Redevelopment Area, Groundbreaking Event for “King Louis Square” 
at Former Darst-Webbe Site is Scheduled Monday, July 24 (July 18, 2000), 
http://stlouis.missouri.org/development/hopevi/pressreleases/groundbreaking.html (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2005).  Similarly, in 2001, HUD awarded a $35 million grant to the St. Louis Housing 
Authority to revitalize the Arthur Blumeyer development. HUD Awards, supra note 93.  
Leveraged resources provided an additional $105 million in public and private funds, including 
commitments from Bank of America, SunAmerica, the Missouri Housing Development 
Commission, the City of St. Louis, and the Danforth Foundation Grants and Empowerment Zone. 
The Housing Research Foundation, Arthur Blumeyer HOPE VI Site Profile, 
http://www.housingresearch.org/hrf/hrf_SiteProfile.nsf  (last visited Jan. 15, 2005). 
 95. See 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,137 pt. I(D)(10). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See FitzPatrick, supra note 10, at 439 (citing Gayle Epp, Emerging Strategies for 
Revitalizing Public Housing Communities, 7 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 563, 570, 571 (1996)). 
 99. See 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,138 pt. III(B)(1)(b). 
 100. Id. 
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D. Consultation and Cooperation with Residents and Public 
To qualify for funding, a HOPE VI applicant must also consult with the 
community of residents affected by the development by means of a “resident 
training session”.”101  Specifically, the local housing authority must 
demonstrate that it has sent out notices informing the residents of its plan and 
held a meeting where residents could challenge the PHA and express their 
concerns.102  In addition to this resident training session, applicants must hold 
at least three pubic meetings to involve the broader community in the 
revitalization plan.103  Failure to satisfy this public notice requirement can 
result in the denial of an application.104 
E. Capacity 
In addition to the more substantive categories listed above, HUD evaluates 
HOPE VI proposals according to the quality of the applicant and the 
experience of the development team assembled.105  In fact, “capacity” is the 
first rating criterion listed on the 2004 NOFA and accounts for the largest 
possible point total of any single criterion.106  The “team” assembled includes 
the PHA staff involved in grant administration, any management entity that 
will manage the property upon revitalization, developers, subcontractors, 
 
 101. Id. at 64,143 pt. III(C)(4)(j).  “HUD does not prescribe the content of this meeting.” Id. 
 102. See Super Notice of Funding Available (“SuperNOFA”) for HUD’s Housing, 
Community Development and Empowerment Programs and Section 8 Housing Voucher 
Assistance for Fiscal Year 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 9322, 9604 pt. IV(C) (2000). 
 103. See 2004 NOFA, supra note 72 at 64,143 pt. III(C)(4)(j).  The public meetings must 
address: the HOPE VI planning and implementation process, the physical plan, the extent of 
demolition, community supportive services, other revitalization activities, relocation issues, re-
occupancy policies, and employment opportunities. Id.  at 64,143-64,144. 
 104. The 2004 NOFA lists this as a threshold requirement which, if not met, may prevent an 
application from even being scored. Id. at 64,138 pt. III(C)(1).  As more than one author has 
noted, however, this public note and comment requirement may be overlooked. See FitzPatrick, 
supra note 10, at 444 n.243 (commenting that “HUD “routinely approves grants in which the 
housing authority has not held a single meeting with residents to determine what input they have 
on the proposed project”) (citations omitted); see also Note, When Hope Falls Short: HOPE VI, 
Accountability, and the Privatization of Public Housing, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1486 (2003) 
(noting that in practice, “many PHAs have failed to involve residents as mandated by HUD[]. . . 
or have done so in a manner that defies the spirit of HUD’s promise of ‘“substantial opportunity’” 
for resident involvement”) (citations omitted).  The requirement’s relative lack of importance may 
also be gleaned from the total weight HUD affords “Resident and Community Involvement” in its 
ranking system: a maximum of 3 points out of a possible 125. 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 
64,159 pt. V(A)(4). 
 105. Id. at 64,155-64,156 Part V(A)(1). 
 106. Id.  Capacity accounts for 25 out of a possible 125 points. Id. at 64,155 pt. V(A)(1), 
64,164 pt. (V)(B).  Soundness of approach is also worth a possible 25 points. Id. at 64,155 pt. 
V(A)(9). 
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consultants, attorneys, financial advisors, and others.107  The capacity of the 
developer seems to be HUD’s main focus, as points are awarded for developers 
who have “extensive, recent (within the last five years), and successful 
experience” in planning, implementing, managing, and constructing projects 
comparable to the proposed development.108  This includes experience with 
low-income tax credits, capital fund projects, financing, leveraging, and home 
sales.109  HUD also evaluates the PHA applying for the grant by examining 
possible gaps in staffing, the program schedule for the various phases of the 
project, and the ability to promptly commence work upon award of the 
grant.110  Finally, HUD considers the applicant’s capacity for managing the 
property. This includes the proposed maintenance budget, the property 
management plan, and the applicant’s past experience managing public 
housing developments.111 
F. Soundness of Approach 
The final major criterion that HUD considers when evaluating a HOPE VI 
proposal is the overall soundness of the approach outlined in the application.112  
The plan must be appropriate and suitable for the community in light of other 
revitalization options, as well as marketable and financially feasible.113  HUD 
also considers the project’s sustainability and its effect on the surrounding 
area, seeking to award grants that will enhance the neighborhood, spur outside 
investment, enhance economic opportunities for residents, and start a 
community-wide revitalization process.114  Further, plans must be actionable. 
“HUD places “top priority on projects that will be able to commence 
immediately.”115  The proposal must also demonstrate excellence in design; the 
new development should be “compatible with and enrich the surrounding 
neighborhoods” and the final design must incorporate housing, community 
 
 107. Id. at 64,155 pt. V(A)(1)(a). 
 108. Id. at 64,155 pt. V(A)(1)(b). 
 109. Id.  
 110. 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,155 pt. V(A)(1)(c).  If the applicant is an existing 
HOPE VI grantee, the PHA must demonstrate that they have made adequate progress 
implementing that proposal. Id. at 64,156 pt. V(A)(1)(d). 
 111. The management plan must detail items such as maintenance, rent collection, tenant 
grievances, eviction, project budgeting, energy audits, and various other items. Id. at 64,157 pt. 
V(A)(1)(f). 
 112. Id. at 64,162 pt. V(A)(9).  As noted supra note 104, soundness of approach is a 
significant rating factor; it accounts for a possible 25 out of 125 points - one-fifth of the total 
maximum points. Id. at 64,162 pt. V(A)(9)(b), 64, 164 pt. V(B)(2)(a)(4). 
 113. Id. at 64,162 pt. V(A)(9)(b). 
 114. Id. at 64,162 pt. V(A)(9)(c). 
 115. Id. at 64,162 pt. V(A)(9)(d). 
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facilities, and economic development space in a well-integrated fashion.116  
Applicants are encouraged to work with architects and designers who are 
committed to allowing resident participation.117  They should also consult with 
local universities, foundations, and other research institutions to evaluate the 
impact and performance of the HOPE VI plan over the life of the grant.118 
G. Replacement Housing 
The HOPE VI program originally called for one-for-one replacement of 
public housing.119  For each unit of public housing that a local housing 
authority demolished, they were required to construct at least one new unit.120  
This one-for-one rule was suspended in the first appropriations bill based on 
the recommendation of the National Commission on Severely Distressed 
Public Housing121 and the elimination was made permanent in 1998.122  Its 
abolition has been controversial and cited by HOPE VI critics as a primary 
cause of the decline in the overall supply of public housing.123  Rather than 
 
 116. 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,162 pt. V(A)(9)(e).  This section seems especially 
tailored to design communities that avoid, or at least diminish, the physical isolation of past 
housing developments - especially the high rise model.  HUD awards points for proposed site 
plans that are: “compact, pedestrian-friendly, with an interconnected network or streets and public 
open space”; that are “thoroughly integrated into the community through the use of local 
architectural tradition, building scale, grouping . . . and design elements”; and that propose 
“appropriate enhancements of the natural environment.” Id. 
 117. 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,163 pt. V(A)(9)(e). 
 118. Id. at 64,162 pt. V(A)(9)(f). 
 119. See Salama, supra note 92, at 105.  Traditional public housing policy required the 
replacement of one unit of public housing for every one unit destroyed. See Miller, supra note 64, 
at 1288 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 42.375 as an example). 
 120. Miller, supra note 64, at 1288. 
 121. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON VA, HUD, 
AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
PUBLIC HOUSING: STATUS OF THE HOPE VI DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM, at 16 (1997), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997.rc97044.pdf; see Miller, supra note 64, at 1288-89 (“In its 
Final Report, the Commission noted that the one for one replacement requirement often forced 
PHAs to retain problematic high density buildings that contributed to distressed conditions 
because it would be too costly or impractical to demolish and replace every lost unit.”). 
 122. Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276 § 535(a), 
112 Stat. 2461, 2518, 2584-2585 (1998); see also Salama, supra note 92, at 113.   
 123. See Eileen M. Greenbaum, Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998: Its 
Major Impact on Development of Public Housing, 8 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY DEV. L. 310, 
314 (1999); CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CHANGE, A HOPE UNSEEN: VOICES FROM THE OTHER 
SIDE OF HOPE VI, (August, 2003) (studying seven different HOPE VI sites and arguing that the 
program and the Public Housing Reform Act only accelerate the trend towards reduction of the 
affordable housing supply, resulting in the displacement of families and a significant net loss in 
available units), available at 
http://www.communitychange.org/shared/publications/downloads/hope_iv/00_HOPEVIfull.doc 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
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require one-for-one replacement of public housing units, the current HOPE VI 
program provides that Section 8 vouchers and eligible homeownership units - 
in addition to traditional public housing units - may account for the balance of 
the units demolished.124 
H. Density and Income Mix 
In past years, HOPE VI proposals were specifically required to address 
resident density and income mix. “Concentration” was listed as a separate 
criterion.125  This reflected one of the program’s central goals: to lessen the 
concentration of very low income families by demolishing larger, obsolete 
developments and creating lower density mixed-income developments in their 
place.126  The current NOFA, however, does not explicitly list density and 
income mix as separate criteria.127  Rather, the mixed-income component is 
addressed under the category “Well Functioning Community.”128  HUD 
maintains that the central purpose of the HOPE VI revitalization program is to 
assist PHAs “[p]rovid[ing] housing that will avoid or decrease the 
concentration of very low income families.”129  However, it is unclear how 
significant the density and income mix features of a proposed development 
remain under the current HOPE VI review and scoring process.130 
 
 124. The 2004 NOFA defines a HOPE VI replacement housing unit as “any combination of 
public housing rental units, eligible homeownership units . . . and HCV [Section 8 Housing 
Choice Voucher] assistance that does not exceed the number of units demolished and disposed of 
at the targeted severely distressed public housing project.” 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,136 
pt. I(C)(3). 
 125. See JAMES A. HEIST, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 
AUDIT OF THE FISCAL YEAR 1996 HOPE VI GRANT AWARD PROCESS, 98-FO-101-0001, at 53 
(1997), available at http://www.hud.gov/oig/ig8h0001.pdf. “Lesson Concentration” was the first 
factor HUD scored for 1996 applications. Id. 
 126. 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,136 pt. I(A). Indeed, one of the central problems 
identified by the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing - whose report led 
to the creation of HOPE VI - was the physical and socioeconomic isolation experienced by public 
housing residents living in a small site with a high concentration of low income families. See 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 41, at app. B, B-3.  As such, the Commission “strongly recommended 
that HUD reduce the concentration of very low income, minority families in public housing 
projects.” See Wexler, supra note 13, at 203.  As Wexler noted, HOPE VI became part of a larger 
plan to replace housing projects with “attractively designed mixed income housing communities.” 
Id. at 204. 
 127. 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,155-64,163 pt. V(A). 
 128. Id. at 64,161 pt. V(A)(8). 
 129. Id. at 64,136 pt. I(A)(3). 
 130. Unit mix accounts for a maximum of only 3 out of a possible 125 points. Id. at 64,161 pt. 
V(A)(8)(a)(2), 64,164 pt. V(B)(2)(a)(4).  Further, HUD does not require a minimum unit mix—
only a “sufficient” amount of public housing rental units, as determined by the applicant. Id. at 
63, 161 pt. V(A)(8)(a)(2)(a).  Applicants are “encouraged” to create additional public housing 
units, though there doesn’t seem to be any significant scoring incentive to do so. Id. 
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I. Scoring Process 
With these baseline criteria identified, HUD scores each application on a 
point system.131  HUD contends that the selection process is “designed to 
ensure that grants are awarded to eligible PHAs with the most meritorious 
applications.”132  The first step is an initial review to ensure that a number of 
threshold requirements are satisfied.133  If the application clears the threshold 
requirement review, it is preliminarily rated according to the criteria identified 
in the NOFA and then ranked by highest score.134  Lastly, a final panel 
comprised of upper-level HUD staff reviews the preliminary ranking 
information, assigns the applications a final score, and selects the most highly 
rated applications, subject to the amount of funding available.135 
V.  HOPE VI ANALYSIS: THE DARST-WEBBE CASE 
A. History 
The Darst-Webbe housing development existed on the near south side of 
downtown St. Louis for more than four decades.  Erected in 1956, the Darst-
Webbe family development was originally “comprised of six clusters of high-
rise developments, containing a total of 758 units.”136  Located just a mile from 
 
 131. Id. at 64,155-64,164 pt. V(A)-(B). 
 132. 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,164 pt. V(B).  However, many commentators have 
criticized HUD’s HOPE VI selection criteria and scoring process, arguing that it is not tailored to 
actually build housing capacity or truly identify the housing most in need of revitalization. See 
Robert Solomon, Notes From the Inside: Thoughts About The Future of Public Housing, 10 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 34, 38 (2002).  Solomon argues that in seeking to score 
applications objectively, HUD “has created a system that places “form over function and rewards 
grantsmanship more than need.” Id.  He notes that this has spawned a small industry of 
consultants to prepare HOPE VI applications - charging fees that range from $100,000 to 
$250,000. Id. 
 133. 2004 NOFA, supra note 72, at 64,164 pt. V(B)(1).  The 2004 NOFA lists a variety of 
threshold requirements, including the appropriateness of the proposed project, the contiguity of 
the project, whether the applicant is an existing HOPE VI grantee that has performed poorly, site 
control, zoning approval, and appropriate certification and documentation requirements. Id. at 
64,138-64,141, pt. III(C). 
 134. Id. at 64,164 pt. V(B)(2).  According to the 2004 NOFA, the maximum number of points 
is 125. Id. at 64,164 pt. V(B)(2)(a)(4).  The most heavily weighted criteria include the capacity 
and experience of the applicant’s “team” (25 points), the overall soundness of the applicant’s 
approach (25 points), the amount of need for revitalization (24 points), and leveraging of 
resources (16 points). Id. at 64,155 pt. V(A)(1), 64,157 pt. V(A)(2), 64,158 pt. V(A)(3), 64,162 
pt. V(A)(9). 
 135. Id. at 64,164 pt. V(B)(3).  The Final Review Panel may reduce funding for any items in 
an applicant’s budget that it determines are “ineligible.” Id. at 64,164 pt. V(B)(4). 
 136. Near Southside Redevelopment Area: Redevelopment Area, http://stlouis.missouri.org/ 
development/hopevi/redeveloparea.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Southside 
Redevelopment Area].  
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downtown St. Louis in a largely industrial area, these nine-story reinforced 
concrete behemoths were fairly typical for their time.  In 1961, several more 
high-rise structures were added, bringing the total number of units to 1,000.137  
The Darst-Webbe site was bordered by additional public housing to the east 
and west.138  The entire complex contained two “super blocks”- occupying 
roughly twelve square blocks spanning sixty-five acres.139  At its peak, Darst-
Webbe was home to an estimated 3,500 people and the site’s density averaged 
thirty units per acre.140 
Darst-Webbe was burdened by the same design deficiencies, budgetary 
constraints, crime, vandalism, and drug use that plagued many of the nation’s 
public housing projects throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  By the early 1990s, 
the development was in severe disrepair.  Substantial physical deterioration 
and site deficiencies made for hazardous and oppressive living conditions.141  
The site needed extensive improvements in almost every major system, 
including plumbing, electrical, building envelope, elevator, lighting, heating 
and cooling, fire alarms, sprinklers, and life-safety.142  An environmental 
inspection revealed asbestos and lead contamination.143  The development was 
also a haven for drug dealers and gang violence - a veritable breeding ground 
for criminal activity.144  HUD assessed the physical needs of the site in 1995 
 
 137. Id.  At its peak, the Darst-Webbe high-rise clusters consisted of six nine-story buildings, 
a twelve story building, and an eight story building. Id. 
 138. Clinton Peabody - located just west of Darst-Webbe - was built in 1942 and consisted of 
52 two and three-story brick buildings with a total of 647 units and a non-dwelling building. Id.  
LaSalle Park Village, constructed in 1976 and containing 148 apartments in 16 two-story 
buildings, sat immediately to the east. Id.  Neither housing development was technically 
considered a part of Darst-Webbe, though the name “Darst-Webbe” was often used loosely to 
refer to the entire 65 acre property. Near Southside Redevelopment Area: Revitalization Plan, 
http://stlouis.missouri.org/development/hopevi/revitalizationplan.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2005) 
[hereinafter Southside Revitalization Plan]. 
 139. Southside Redevelopment Area, supra note 136; Southside Revitalization Plan, supra 
note 138. 
 140. Southside Redevelopment Area, supra note 136. 
 141. Darst-Webbe HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, Exhibit B, Existing Site Conditions, (1998) 
(prepared by the St. Louis Housing Authority), available at 
http://stlouis.missouri.org/development/hopevi/rplist.html  (last visited Jan. 15, 2005) [hereinafter 
Darst-Webbe Revitalization Plan, Exhibit B].  The St. Louis Housing Authority provided the 
following description of deterioration at Darst-Webbe: “The site is plagued with deteriorated 
sewers and laterals, deteriorated parking lots and walks, with lawn areas that are bare and sunken.  
Architecturally, the walls, roof, and windows are thermally inefficient and leak.  Kitchen 
cabinets, countertops, plaster, doors, closet doors, and windows are deteriorated, damaged, or 
missing altogether.  The mechanical systems are obsolete, beyond their life expectancy, and do 
not meet code requirements.” Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. 
 144. A site evaluation of the neighboring Clinton Peabody development blamed the 
prevalence of crime on severe density and design failures, namely the existence of large tracts of 
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and determined that total renovation would have cost more than $55 million, 
roughly $72,000 per unit.145  Simply bringing the buildings in line with 
existing federally mandated Housing Quality Standards was estimated at more 
than $6 million.146 
Darst-Webbe’s physical deterioration was exacerbated by the fact that the 
buildings were largely unoccupied and left open to the elements.  As of 1998, 
the family buildings at Darst-Webbe were eighty-five percent vacant.147  The 
proximity of the abandoned City Hospital Complex, occupying thirteen acres 
immediately to the southwest, only added to the general atmosphere of 
desolation and blight.  While surrounding neighborhoods like Soulard, 
Lafayette Square, and LaSalle Park were thriving in the midst of an urban 
redevelopment in many of St. Louis’ historic districts, Darst-Webbe stuck out 
like a sore-thumb with an abandoned expanse of broken windows, boarded 
doorways, and crumbling mortar. 
B. HUD Awards HOPE VI Grant to Revitalize Darst-Webbe 
In 1994, HUD awarded the St. Louis Housing Authority (“SLHA”) a 
$500,000 HOPE VI planning grant to explore options for redeveloping Darst-
Webbe.148  In January 1995, HUD approved a $46.7 million grant to revitalize 
the complex and entered into a HOPE VI implementation grant agreement with 
SLHA.149  As part of the agreement, SLHA filed a revitalization plan statement 
“”with HUD in April 1995, detailing its approach for the Darst-Webbe site.150  
The plan called for the destruction of 758 units of family public housing, 
replacing them with a 550-unit mixed-income development that would include 
200 newly constructed family public housing units.151  The remainder would 
 
“no-man’s land” that were magnets for drug dealing and undesirable public congregations.  In his 
memorandum assessing the property, Ray Gindroz, Principal Architect for Urban Design 
Associates, described the site as “one of the most effective design[s] for the promotion of 
criminal activity” that he has ever encountered. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. The estimate was conducted in conjunction with the HUD mandated Physical Needs 
Assessment of all property administered by the St. Louis Housing Authority. Darst-Webbe 
Revitalization Plan, Exhibit B, supra note 141. 
 147. Id.  
 148. The Housing Research Foundation, Darst-Webbe HOPE VI Site Profile,  
http://www.housingresearch.org/hrf/hrf_SiteProfile.nsf/0/b93a6f8c87bc8101852569d5004d168d?
OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Darst-Webbe Site Profile].   
 149. Id. 
 150. Darst-Webbe HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, Exhibit A, Executive Summary 3 (1998) 
(prepared by the St. Louis Housing Authority), available at 
http://stlouis.missouri.org/development/hopevi/rplist.html  (last visited Jan. 15, 2005) [hereinafter 
Darst-Webbe Revitalization Plan, Exhibit A].  Kuhlman Design Group of St. Louis prepared the 
plan for the SLHA. Id. 
 151. Darst-Webbe Site Profile, supra note 148. 
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be a mix of tax-credit rental units and “for sale” units.152  The plan also 
included demolishing the adjacent City Hospital complex.153  HUD approved 
the plan on July 13, 1995.154 
Due to a lack of construction progress on the City Hospital site, HUD 
placed the Darst-Webbe HOPE VI grant in default in August 1997 and 
threatened to recapture the $46.7 million.155  After representatives from the 
City of St. Louis and SLHA met with HUD officials in Washington, D.C., 
HUD agreed to provide SLHA with a technical assistance consulting team in 
an effort to cure the default.156  The team convened a market study and helped 
SLHA establish a Steering Committee to address the deficiencies of their 
initial HOPE VI plan.157  Among the recommendations HUD made was for the 
City of St. Louis to apply for $50 million in Section 108 loan assistance - $20 
million of which would be applied to demolishing the hospital complex and 
building infrastructure on the Darst-Webbe redevelopment site.158  HUD 
issued a conditional cure of the grant and released the funds.159 
As part of its process for curing the default, HUD required SLHA to 
submit a new formal revitalization plan.160  SLHA expanded the HOPE VI 
redevelopment to include the neighboring Clinton Peabody development.161  In 
addition to demolishing the 758-unit Darst-Webbe family development, the 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. The Revitalization Plan did not originally call for spending any HOPE VI funds on the 
nearby Clinton Peabody development. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Darst-Webbe HOPE VI Program Implementation Technical Assistance, 
http://www.abtassociates.com/Page.cfm?PageID=1824&OWID=2109767283&CSB=1 (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2005). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Darst-Webbe HOPE VI Program Implementation Technical Assistance, 
http://www.abtassociates.com/Page.cfm?PageID=1824&OWID=2109767283&CSB=1 (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2005).  The Steering Committee consisted of key stakeholders including residents, 
elected officials and city staff, service providers, corporate leaders, neighborhood representatives, 
and SLHA staff to help guide the process. Id.  This Steering Committee significantly reduced the 
role of Darst-Webbe residents in planning, implementing, and monitoring the HOPE VI program. 
Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth. (Darst-Webbe I), 202 F. Supp. 2d 938, 
942 (E.D. Mo. 2001).  After the committee was formed, SLHA stopped convening meetings of 
the Joint Advisory Development Committee - a panel formed in an agreement with the tenant 
associations affected by the redevelopment. Id.The JADC was to meet bi-weekly, approve 
budgets, and “participate in selecting the various professionals involved in planning and 
implementing the development.” Id. 
 158. Id. at 942-43.   
 159. Id. at 942; Darst-Webbe Revitalization Plan, Exhibit A, supra note 150, at 3. 
 160. The HUD team assisted SLHA in preparing the new Revitalization Plan and SLHA 
submitted it on October 30, 1998; HUD gave the new plan final approval on April 28, 1999. 
Darst-Webbe I, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 942-43, 947. 
 161. Id.  The new plan was also expanded to address conditions on several adjacent blocks 
that were not owned by SLHA. Id. 
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new plan called for eliminating 217 more units of public housing at Clinton 
Peabody, as well as an additional 242 units of elderly public housing at Darst-
Webbe.162  Like the original plan approved in 1995, the 1998 plan proposed 
construction of a 550-unit mixed income development.163  However, whereas 
the original HOPE VI proposal provided for 200 units of family public 
housing, the new plan called for only 80 units of public housing to replace the 
1000-plus demolished units.164 
C. Darst-Webbe Tenant Association Files Suit 
In response to the changes made in the new revitalization plan, the Darst-
Webbe Tenant Association Board “”filed an action against SLHA and HUD in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on March 
3, 1999.165  The Tenant Board brought twelve counts against SLHA and seven 
counts against HUD, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin SLHA 
from proceeding with the Darst-Webbe development.166  Plaintiffs challenged 
the demolition of public housing units at Darst-Webbe and Clinton Peabody 
and the displacement of its residents, arguing that HUD failed to sufficiently 
consider the fair housing effects of the Darst-Webbe HOPE VI plan when 
reviewing the proposal.167  Their central theory was that the elimination of the 
extra units of public housing had a disparate impact on African-Americans in 
 
 162. Brief of Appellants at 9, Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., No. 
04-1614 (8th Cir. 2004), available at 2004 WL 2738766. 
 163. Id.  Of these 550 units, 250 would be single-family and duplex “for sale” units and 300 
would be family rental units. Darst-Webbe HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, Exhibit D, Physical 
Revitalization Plan 47 (1988) (prepared by the Saint Louis Hosing Authority), available at 
http://stlouis.missouri/development/hopevi/rplist.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2005) [hereinafter 
Physical Revitalization Plan]. 
 164. Brief of Appellants at 9, Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., No. 
04-1614 (8th Cir. 2004), available at 2004 WL 2738766.  The new revitalization plan also 
contemplated the construction of 72 “for sale” units in neighborhoods throughout the city, but 
outside the Darst-Webbe revitalization area. Physical Revitalization Plan, supra note 163.  The 
units qualified as public housing replacement according to HUD’s standards because they were 
targeted to families at sixty to eighty percent ($28,260–$37,680) of area median income. Brief of 
Appellants at 9-10, Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., No. 04-1614 (8th 
Cir. 2004), available at 2004 WL 2738766.  The plan set aside $7 million in HOPE VI funds to 
finance their construction. SLHA also budgeted $3 million of the award for the construction of a 
Community Recreation Center at the Darst-Webbe site. Id.  
 165. ’’Brief of Appellants/Cross Appellees at 11, Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n v. St. Louis 
Hous. Auth., No. 02-1777/1778 (8th Cir. 2002), available at 2002 WL 32375102.   
 166. Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth. (Darst-Webbe I), 202 F. Supp. 
2d 938, 939, 945 (E.D. Mo. 2001), aff’d in part and remanded in part by 339 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 
2003), remanded to 299 F. Supp. 2d 952 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d by 417 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 167. Darst-Webbe I, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 939-40 n.1; see Brief of Appellants at 16-17, Darst-
Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., No. 04-1614 (8th Cir. 2004), available at 
2004 WL 2738766.   
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St. Louis and that HUD, in approving SLHA’s new HOPE VI plan, thus failed 
to meet its duty to affirmatively further fair housing in violation of the Fair 
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e).168 
After the district court entered summary judgment on Count XIV in favor 
of HUD,169 the remaining eighteen claims proceeded to a bench trial over six 
days in July 2001.170  The district court, the Honorable Stephen Limbaugh, 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on two counts and in favor of HUD on the 
remaining counts.171  In an admittedly unconventional approach,172 the court 
began its analysis of the case by first examining the relief sought by the 
plaintiffs and then determining whether plaintiffs were entitled to that relief.  
The court did not address each count individually.173 
The district court reached its decision on the majority of the counts without 
engaging in any substantial analysis of the HOPE VI plan.  In dismissing the 
plaintiffs’ contention that HUD failed to affirmatively further fair housing, 
Judge Limbaugh stated: “[o]bviously, HUD believes that it has taken all 
necessary steps to further fair housing.  If plaintiffs are requesting that the 
court set out detailed steps, it will not do so.”174  The court noted that it had 
power to review agency decisions, but strongly rejected the suggestion that it 
should examine HUD’s review process in the instant case: “[t]he Court is not 
going to give specific instructions to the defendants, telling them how they 
should involve plaintiffs in the planning, implementing, and monitoring of the 
 
 168. Darst-Webbe I, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 939-40, n.1. 
 169. See id. at 939.  This Count challenged HUD’s approval of the Section 108 loan to the 
City of St. Louis as part of the HOPE VI financing. Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis 
Hous. Auth. (Darst-Webbe II), 339 F.3d 702, 707-08 (8th Cir. 2003).  On appeal, the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Id. at 708 
 170. The Darst-Webbe case was the first HOPE VI discrimination case to go to trial. See 
Press Release, The Housing Research Foundation, HUD and St. Louis Housing Authority Prevail 
in First HOPE VI Discrimination Case,  http://www.housingresearch.org/hrf/hrfhome.nsf/e9c242 
79c3bd4d1085256a0300779c07/4d6e2bb63b96f38c85256b2500752337?OpenDocument (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2005). 
 171. The Court found that HUD had impermissibly expanded the scope of the HOPE VI 
project to include Clinton Peabody. Darst-Webbe I, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 939, 950.  Shortly after the 
trial, HUD issued an official determination that Clinton Peabody was severely distressed and 
formally approved the inclusion of that development within the Darst-Webbe HOPE VI project. 
Darst-Webbe II, 339 F.3d at 706  n.4. 
 172. As Judge Limbaugh explained: “[t]he Court has determined that it would be impossible 
to go through and address each count.  Most of the counts overlap in either the facts that might 
support them, or the relief being sought for them, or both.  It is obvious from the disjointed 
complaint, summary judgment motions and the arguments made at trial, that nobody knows 
exactly how to address this cause of action.  The issues addressed by the parties often times never 
meet, and it is impossible for the Court to evaluate the arguments.” Darst-Webbe I, 202 F. Supp. 
2d at 944. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 949. 
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HOPE VI plan.  Defendants should involve plaintiffs in the planning, and the 
Court believes defendants know that.”175 
With that, the court stated that “it has addressed the remainder of plaintiffs’ 
claims and finds . . .  in favor of the defendants.”176  The court did not examine 
the specific provisions of the HOPE VI plan—including the unit mix and the 
decision to provide only 80 units of public housing as opposed to 200 units—
and failed to make any specific factual findings in concluding that HUD 
satisfied its obligation to affirmatively further fair housing.177  In its 
concluding remarks, the court expressed frustration that the case was ever 
brought and urged the parties to work together to forge an understanding 
without judicial intervention.178 
D. Eighth Circuit Remands 
The Tenant Board appealed the decision, narrowing its challenge to eight 
of the original eighteen counts.179  Among their arguments was that the trial 
court erred in determining that HUD fulfilled its obligation to affirmatively 
further fair housing without making sufficient factual findings.180  The Eighth 
Circuit agreed and remanded the case in part, instructing the district court to 
provide a more detailed explanation for its conclusions on six of the eight 
counts.181 
The Eighth Circuit found that the Tenant Board did present evidence that 
HUD failed to consider the ramifications of the proposed HOPE VI program 
on its obligation to affirmatively further fair housing.182  In explaining its 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 950. 
 177. In a footnote to the opinion, the court noted: “Counts I-IV, XIII, XVII, and XVIII 
contain allegations of discrimination based on race, sex, and familial status.  Although the Court 
did not analyze these counts, it would like to note that it found absolutely no evidence of 
discrimination.” Darst-Webbe I, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 950 n.17 (emphasis added). 
 178. As the court explained: “[t]his is a case that never should have been before the Courts.  
Plaintiffs are public housing tenants and defendants are the agencies responsible for providing 
public housing.  They both depend on each other, and it is logical that they should work together, 
even without a legal mandate to do so.  The Court seriously hopes all parties involved can resolve 
their problems, and work together to achieve the best results in completing this worthwhile 
project.” Id. at 949. 
 179. Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth. (Darst-Webbe II), 339 F.3d 
702, 708 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 713. The remand was more a procedural correction than a stinging rebuke.  As the 
Court noted, “[w]e sympathize with the difficult situation the district court faced in resolving this 
complicated case.  While we do not necessarily disagree with the ultimate conclusion reached by 
the district court, we are unable to affirm the district court on six of the . . . counts, because the 
memorandum opinion fails to provide the detail required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a).” Id. at 715. 
 182. Id. at 713. 
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decision to remand, the court discussed the scope of 42 U.S.C. 3608(e) and 
HUD’s duty to affirmatively further fair housing.  As the court noted, the FHA 
imposes upon HUD an affirmative obligation.  It requires more than simply 
refraining from discriminatory action or from purposely aiding discrimination 
by others.183  HUD must make its program decisions by considering the effect 
of its grants on the racial and socioeconomic composition of the surrounding 
area.184  At a minimum, HUD has an obligation to “assess negatively “those 
aspects of a proposed course of action that would further limit the supply of 
genuinely open housing” and to weigh possible alternatives.185  Stated broadly, 
the duty to affirmatively further fair housing mandates that HUD must take 
action “to fulfill, as much as possible, the goal of open, integrated residential 
housing patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation.”186  The FHA 
certainly does not mandate specific actions or remedial plans, but it does hold 
HUD’s actions to a high standard.187 
The Eighth Circuit also discussed the legal standard for reviewing an 
agency’s actions and the district court’s authority to set aside a decision.188  
Section 3608 of the FHA is enforceable through the Administrative Protection 
Act (“APA”), which regulates the administration and operation of federal 
agencies.189  Under the APA, a reviewing court shall declare unlawful and set 
aside agency actions that it finds to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion.190  The court explained: 
“Clearly, HUD possesses broad discretionary powers to develop, award, and 
administer its grants and to decide the degree to which they can be shaped to 
help achieve Title VIII’s goals.  This fact, however, does not in itself mean that 
HUD is immune from review for “abuse of discretion” in exercising these 
powers.”191 
The court concluded by noting that the district court had the power to enjoin 
the use of HOPE VI funds or Section 108 loan guarantees until it was satisfied 
that HUD had taken appropriate steps to affirmatively further fair housing.192 
 
 183. Id. (citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 
1987)). 
 184. Darst-Webbe II, 339 F.3d at 713 (citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
817 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1987)). 
 185. Id.  
 186. N.A.A.C.P. v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting 
Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
 187. See McGrath v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 722 F. Supp. 902, 908 (D. Mass. 1989). 
 188. Darst-Webbe II, 339 F.3d at 713-14. 
 189. See id. at 709 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)). 
 190. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). 
 191. Darst-Webbe II, 339 F.3d at 713 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
817 F.2d 149, 157 (1st Cir. 1987)). 
 192. Id. at 713-14. 
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E. District Court Dismisses Suit Again 
On remand, the district court did not hear new evidence or hear new 
argument as neither party requested leave to file any submissions.193  The court 
again found for HUD on all six remaining counts, but endeavored to provide a 
more thorough explanation of its decision as directed by the Eighth Circuit.  At 
the outset, the court acknowledged difficulty in reviewing HUD’s decision.194  
It noted the many competing policy goals facing HUD in undertaking a 
community revitalization project and determined that HUD did consider the 
fair housing needs of the St. Louis community in approving the Darst-Webbe 
HOPE VI plan.195 
While the district court again held that HUD had fulfilled its duty to further 
fair housing affirmatively, it provided little in the way of substantive analysis 
and specific factual findings.  The court’s analysis focused only on whether 
HUD considered the fair housing needs of the St. Louis community.196  The 
court did not address the unit mix, the elimination of the extra 120 units of 
affordable housing, or other specific details of the HOPE VI Revitalization 
Plan.197  Instead, the court noted that while it may have chosen different 
 
 193. Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth. (Darst-Webbe III), 299 F. Supp. 
2d 952, 955 (E.D. Mo. 2004). 
 194. Id. at 954-55, 967.  “The Court notes that the administrative process followed in this case 
was not so readily susceptible to review. . . .  [I]nstead, the case at bar presents the Court with 
thousands of pages of reports, proposals, planning documents, and letters, each of which 
implicate multiple policy goals and address different statutory and regulatory requirements.” Id. 
at 963. 
 195. The Court referred to the “Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing - City of St. Louis 
Report”, a report submitted by HUD and prepared by the University of Missouri-St. Louis Public 
Policy Research Center in conjunction with the HOPE VI plan. Id. at 964.  The Court noted that 
HUD “carefully considered” the AI Report when it conducted a community assessment. Id.  In 
deciding whether HUD took appropriate action to respond to the impediments to fair housing in 
the St. Louis area, the Court declined to apply a test “mechanistically.” Id. at 965.  As the Court 
noted, 
HUD had many other issues before it besides the fair housing impact of the Plan such as 
the HOPE VI goals of deconcentrating low-income public housing populations, reducing 
the density of existing low-income housing, and providing a community centered 
approach to revitalizing the Near Southside.  Even so, one fact that stands out is HUD’s 
recognition that a lack of affordable home-ownership opportunities and the lack of 
necessary knowledge and resources on the part of potential minority homebuyers, are two 
of the most serious impediments to fair housing in the St. Louis market. 
Id.  
 196. Id. 
 197. As it did at the trial level, the Court refrained from addressing the specifics of SLHA’s 
Revitalization Plan. Darst-Webbe III, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 962-63.  As the Court noted: “[t]he 
Plaintiffs chose to focus on what they saw as the final product of the Revitalization Plan (the unit 
mix in the finished development) during the trial of this case; but a review of HUD’s actions 
under the APA standard . . . requires the Court to look at the regulatory process behind HUD’s 
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solutions, HUD’s actions were not arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of 
discretion and thus lied outside the purview of the court’s review.198  
Accordingly, it dismissed the action.199 
F. Eighth Circuit Affirms 
The Tenant Board again appealed to the Eighth Circuit, arguing that the 
district court failed on remand to engage in the analysis and fact finding 
necessary to properly determine whether HUD satisfied its FHA duty.200  The 
Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that the district court reviewed the “large 
volume of documentary evidence” generated throughout the revitalization 
efforts.201  In rejecting the Tenant Board’s argument that HUD and SLHA 
failed to consider the proposal to add 120 rental units, the Eighth Circuit noted 
that it was not a “secondary legislative body” designed to amend and rework 
the planning decisions of government agencies.202 
In discussing the claim that HUD failed to affirmatively further fair 
housing, the court emphasized the highly deferential standard of review 
applied to agency decisions under the APA.203  As the court explained, the 
standard of review is deferential because “it is not the role of the courts to 
micro-manage agency actions for compliance with broad, general statutory 
 
actions before comparing the outcome with the statutory command.” Id. at 963 (emphasis in 
original). 
 198. Id. at 966-67. 
 199. Id. at 967. 
 200. In its Brief, the Tenant Board argued that HUD’s decision approving the HOPE VI plan 
and its program to replace only 80 of the more than 1000 demolished family public housing rental 
units was “devoid of any consideration of the impact on protected classes” and reflected no 
negative assessment of how that action would “further limit[] the supply of genuinely open 
housing.”  Brief of Appellants at 57, Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 
No. 04-1614 (8th Cir. 2004), available at 2004 WL 2738766. According to the Tenant Board, the 
author of HUD’s approval decision admitted that the agency had not analyzed the effects of the 
plan on African Americans. Id.  The plaintiffs further maintained that HUD’s decision reflected 
“no positive assessment of alternatives that would increase the supply of open housing”,” namely 
the Tenant Board’s proposal to add another 120 rental units of affordable housing. Id. at 58-59.  
The district court failed to address these issues on remand and made no factual findings in its 
opinion. Darst-Webbe III, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 965-67. 
 201. Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n v. St. Louis Hous. Auth. (Darst-Webbe IV), 417 F.3d 898, 
907-08 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 202. Id. at 904.  As the court remarked, “our review is not to determine if one, ten, or one 
hundred additional, replacement, low-income rental units should have been included in the 
amended plan.  Rather, our review is to ensure that a demonstrated disparate impact in housing be 
justified by a legitimate and substantial goal of the measure in question.” Id. (citation omitted) 
 203. Id. at 907.  As noted earlier, a court will reverse an agency decision under the APA only 
where it finds the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 5 U.S.C. § 
706(2)(A) (2000). 
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mandates.”204  The duty to affirmatively further fair housing is certainly a 
broad statutory mandate. As such, the court noted that its review of HUD’s 
action “is not a review to determine whether HUD has, in fact achieved 
tangible results in the form of furthering opportunities for fair housing.”205  
Rather, its review is limited simply to assessing “whether HUD exercised its 
broad authority in a manner that demonstrates consideration of, and an effort to 
achieve, such results.”206  With that, the court affirmed the district court’s 
finding that HUD satisfied its statutory requirements.207 
VI.  THE LESSONS OF DARST-WEBBE 
The Darst-Webbe case illustrates that the range of discretion afforded 
HUD in the HOPE VI context is simply too broad.  The system in place 
provides no assurances that HUD will satisfy its duty to affirmatively further 
fair housing.  The FHA clearly mandates that HUD must act to end 
discrimination and segregation in the nation’s public housing stock by 
affirmatively furthering fair housing,208 but this is a nebulous concept.  HUD 
and courts have refrained from promulgating specific guidelines or 
requirements that could be used to glean a more thorough definition of what it 
means to affirmatively further fair housing and to gauge whether HUD is in 
fact satisfying that obligation.  As a result, HUD can satisfy its legal standard 
simply by demonstrating it considered relevant data, effects, and options in 
reaching a decision. If HUD’s duty to “affirmatively further” fair housing is to 
have any substance, then this range of discretion must be narrowed. More must 
be done to hold HUD accountable to its fair housing obligation and to ensure 
that HUD utilizes HOPE VI funding as a vehicle to adequately service the 
needs of the nation’s lowest income families. 
A. The Judiciary Will Be Ineffective in Narrowing HUD’s Range of 
Discretion 
An obvious starting point for possible ways to narrow HUD’s discretion 
and increase accountability is the judicial system.  The courts are essentially 
 
 204. Darst-Webbe VI, 417 F.3d at 907.  The Eighth Circuit relied heavily on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63 
(2004).  In Norton, the Court said the APA “protect[s] agencies from “undue judicial interference 
with their lawful discretion” and “pervasive oversight by federal courts over the manner and pace 
of [their] compliance with . . . congressional directives.”  Id. at 66-67. 
 205. Darst-Webbe IV, 417 F.3d at 907. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 909.  In its closing remarks, the court expressed its hope that “future actions of this 
type would involve a more explicit discussion from the agency regarding [the] impact on 
protected classes”; nonetheless, it could not conclude that HUD failed to satisfy its statutory 
obligations under the FHA and APA. Id. 
 208. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d)-(e) (2000). 
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the only outlet for affected residents or public housing advocates to challenge a 
HOPE VI project.  Courts have authority to review agency decisions and to 
ensure that HUD actions and policies comport with the requirements of the 
Constitution and federal law.  Admittedly, courts must afford considerable 
deference to an agency’s decision if it is supported by a rational basis.209  A 
court may not intervene and substitute its own policy choices for that of the 
agency when reviewing decisions under the “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard.210  However, such deference does not require a court to countenance 
an agency’s failure to consider an important aspect of the problem it is 
addressing.211  Courts should strive to hold HUD accountable to its obligation 
to use HOPE VI to affirmatively further fair housing and to fulfill the goals of 
the FHA. 
At a minimum, courts should engage in a more detailed review of HUD’s 
HOPE VI selection process to ensure that HUD thoroughly considers the fair 
housing effects of its grants.  Courts should demand that HUD provide 
satisfactory explanations for its grant awards and should evaluate these 
explanations in light of HUD’s statutory mission and the goals of the FHA.212  
Specifically, courts should examine more closely and critically HUD’s 
decision to fund a particular HOPE VI project and analyze whether the plan for 
that project adequately addresses the fair housing concerns of the affected 
residents.  A review of the proper unit mix, the total number of families 
displaced, the percentage of families able to return to the new development, 
and the total decline in the number of affordable housing units would require 
HUD to more thoroughly explain its decision-making process and show that it 
seriously explored alternatives in passing on a particular HOPE VI proposal. 
Indeed, the one promising precedent to emerge from the Darst-Webbe case 
thus far is that trial courts must conduct some form of review before dismissing 
a HOPE VI challenge.  Courts may not reach a decision without first engaging 
in some level of analysis and examination of HUD’s grant award process.  The 
Eighth Circuit appears to now require a more detailed statement of fact finding 
to this effect at the trial level.213  This is the only way to develop any type of 
precedent or to ensure proper appellate review.  While it is doubtful this will 
create any significant objective measure of what it means to affirmatively 
further fair housing, it is at least an improvement from the total lack of analysis 
 
 209. See Fort Mill Telephone Co. v. F.C.C., 719 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1983). 
 210. Id. 
 211. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983). 
 212. See N.A.A.C.P v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 158 (1st Cir. 1987); see 
also Bankr.  Estate of United States Shipping Co., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc. 34 F.3d 1383, 1390 (8th 
Cir. 1994). 
 213. Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth. (Darst-Webbe II), 339 F.3d 
702, 713-14 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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conducted by the district court in Darst-Webbe.  It is a step in the right 
direction for narrowing HUD’s range of discretion and providing substance to 
the FHA mandate, but it will not be enough. 
In practice, the role of the courts seems to be limited.  The Darst-Webbe 
case suggests the judiciary will not provide an effective outlet for meaningful 
change in the way HUD administers HOPE VI.214  The mechanisms simply do 
not exist for the courts to question and challenge many of the specific parts of a 
revitalization plan.  Moreover, courts may be unwilling to examine the details 
of a revitalization plan, preferring instead to defer to HUD as the experts in 
determining the specifics of its housing programs and grant administration.  
While the need for latitude in allowing agencies to establish and enact policy 
decisions unfettered by piecemeal judicial intervention is considerable, the 
result is a high degree of unaccountability for HUD, at least in the details of 
the HOPE VI plans that it approves. 
As the Darst-Webbe case illustrates, trial courts may be reluctant to 
examine the details of a HOPE VI plan and proscribe adjustments.  There, the 
district court expressly refused to set out specific steps that HUD should follow 
to satisfy its duty to affirmatively further fair housing.  It refrained from 
engaging in a detailed review of the revitalization plan, noting that it would not 
challenge on a “line-item basis” the particular details and decisions HUD 
made.215  Neither at trial nor on remand did the district court discuss the unit 
 
 214. Admittedly, reaching this conclusion based largely on a single case may be a bit 
premature.  However, the language of the district court and Eighth Circuit and the standards of 
review they applied suggest the judiciary lacks the authority to effect substantive change in 
HOPE VI.  The ability of courts to review agency decisions is incredibly narrow.  Their power is 
essentially limited to ensuring that HUD considers the fair housing affects of its grant awards by 
examining relevant data and considering alternatives.  This is a very minimal showing that HUD 
can easily satisfy. 
  While other circuits and district courts have heard challenges to HOPE VI awards, none 
have wrestled with the specific question raised by the plaintiffs in Darst-Webbe: has HUD met its 
duty to affirmatively further fair housing in implementing a specific HOPE VI redevelopment 
plan? See, e.g., COLISEUM SQUARE ASS’N, INC. V. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 2003 WL 
715758 (E.D. La. 2003) (denying injunctive relief to temporarily stop progress on a HOPE VI 
development pending compliance with environmental and historic property regulations).  The 
court later dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint in COLISEUM SQUARE ASS’N, INC. V. DEP’T OF 
HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 2003 WL 1873094 (E.D. La. 2003); see also Reese v. Miami Dade 
County, 2003 WL 22025458 (11th Cir. 2003) (denying residents request for injunctive relief to 
stop a HOPE VI development because they failed to show irreparable harm); PARAQUAD, INC. V. 
ST. LOUIS HOUS. AUTH., 259 F.3d 956, 959-60 (8th Cir. 2001) (dismissing plaintiff’s challenge 
of HOPE VI development for failure to conform with the Americans with Disabilities Act as 
moot because the plan did not pose “certainly impending” harm to tenants); GAUTREAUX V. 
CHICAGO HOUS. AUTH., 178 F.3d 951 (7th Cir 1999) (dismissing plaintiffs petition to uphold an 
injunction restricting the use of HOPE VI funds for lack of jurisdiction). 
 215. Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth. (Darst Webbe III), 299 F. Supp. 
2d 952, 967 (E.D. Mo. 2004). 
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mix or address the plaintiffs’ specific argument that the HOPE VI Plan called 
for an insufficient amount of affordable housing and could have supported 
additional units. 
In its current form, the HOPE VI program does not proscribe any 
requirements or minimum standards for particulars such as the unit mix, the 
total number of affordable housing units that may be destroyed, the total 
number of affordable units that must be rebuilt, the total number of families 
displaced, or the percentage of displaced families that must be allowed to 
return to the completed development.  These are all details that HUD commits 
to the discretion of the grant applicants.  Thus, it is doubtful that courts will 
mandate adjustments to these details of a HOPE VI plan, preferring instead to 
yield to HUD because the criteria involve more specialized knowledge of 
agency experts and industry specialists.  If the district court in Darst-Webbe is 
any indication, courts will refrain from setting out detailed steps for HUD to 
follow in administering HOPE VI.  As such, courts will be unable to provide 
objective measures for determining whether a particular HOPE VI plan 
affirmatively furthers fair housing. 
Even those judges, who may be receptive to arguments that a HOPE VI 
project provides an inadequate number of affordable units, and thus fails to 
affirmatively further fair housing, may be hard pressed to find the judicial 
means to effect change.  An excerpt from Darst-Webbe illustrates the point: 
“[U]nless some nexus is drawn between discrimination and the Plan, the unit 
mix is up to the agencies entrusted with creating the development.  HUD and 
the SLHA had a series of complicated decisions to make, and while the Court 
has never taken lightly the impact of those decisions on the lives of the 
residents of the existing public housing in the Revitalization Plan Area, neither 
can the Court disregard the considered policy decisions of the agencies 
entrusted with directing the redevelopment of the Area.”216 
The court continued by noting that while it may have chosen different 
solutions such as a more aggressive unit mix or a mortgage program for low-
income home buyers, “[t]his is not a case where HUD’s actions are so 
egregious, so inconsistent with its duty to affirmatively further fair housing, 
that a dereliction of duty can be presumed.”217 
Where the standard for intervention is so high, it seems clear that courts 
will be unable, and not just unwilling, to effect any serious change in the way 
HUD reviews HOPE VI applications and administers funding for the program.  
The only way to effect real change is to examine the details of a HOPE VI plan 
and inquire whether HUD could do more to provide a greater number of 
affordable housing units.  Under the standard of review mandated by the APA, 
however, so long as HUD demonstrates it at least considered the fair housing 
 
 216. Id. at 962. 
 217. Id. at 963. 
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effects of its policies and grants, then HUD has technically satisfied its legal 
obligation. Little else remains for the courts to do.  While courts should 
nonetheless try to narrow HUD’s range of discretion and give effect to the 
FHA mandate to affirmatively further fair housing, any meaningful change in 
HOPE VI must come internally through HUD. 
B. HUD Should Evaluate HOPE VI in Light of Its FHA Mandate 
HUD must do more to ensure that it is utilizing HOPE VI to adequately 
provide for the housing needs of the urban poor.  While HUD hails the 
program as an innovative approach for eliminating the nation’s most severely 
distressed housing projects, the undeniable result is a decrease in the total 
number of affordable units.  Indeed, the reduction in density of public housing 
sites is one of the program’s express goals.  Given the shortage of units 
available to those people with “very low” and “extremely low” incomes, HUD 
should undertake a comprehensive review of HOPE VI and consider its role as 
a contributing factor in the decline of available public housing. 
HUD should also evaluate its selection criteria and consider its review and 
scoring processes in light of the FHA mandate to affirmatively further fair 
housing.  As noted above, HUD has refrained from issuing programmatic 
guidelines to administer HOPE VI.  One of the unique features of HOPE VI is 
that it allows PHAs and private developers the freedom to determine the vast 
majority of the physical features and details of the site plans they submit for 
consideration.  Details such as the unit mix, the total number of affordable 
units, the total reduction in the number of affordable units, and the percentage 
of displaced affordable housing tenants able to return are all committed to the 
discretion of the private party applicants.  HUD should consider establishing 
minimum thresholds that a plan must meet in these regards. 
Additionally, HUD should consider revising its scoring criteria. Under the 
current structure, HUD gives significant weight to the capacity of the 
applicant’s team and the overall soundness of the approach.  Little if any 
weight is accorded to the number of replacement public housing units 
proposed.  HUD should consider a point scheme that rewards those applicants 
whose proposal calls for a more aggressive unit mix and retains a higher 
percentage of displaced families.  While these revisions would undeniably alter 
the character of the program, they could be a means of ensuring that HOPE VI 
applicants provide for an adequate number of replacement public housing units 
in their proposals.  This would be consistent with the spirit of affirmatively 
furthering fair housing. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
It is unclear what exactly it means to affirmatively further fair housing in 
the HOPE VI context.  What is clear is that HUD enjoys incredibly broad 
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discretion in shaping and administering the program.  This range of discretion 
must be narrowed to give life to the Fair Housing Act’s mandate.  More must 
be done to ensure that the HOPE VI proposals selected for funding are 
genuinely tailored to address the needs of the public housing residents 
displaced.  While courts should evaluate the specific details of a HOPE VI 
proposal and demand thorough explanation from HUD for its decisions, their 
power seems to be limited.  As the judiciary is an unlikely option for providing 
substantive change, HUD must re-evaluate the program and assess whether it 
is fulfilling its fair housing obligation.  HOPE VI may indeed be an innovative, 
community-based approach for revitalizing dilapidated ghettos.  So long as the 
end result of this revitalization is a reduction in the overall supply of affordable 
housing units in the face of consistent demand, however, HOPE VI can hardly 
be said to affirmatively further fair housing. 
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